C O O P E R A T I O N 6The Principles of Tit for TatAxelrod distilled several principles from his observation of how well Tit for Tat did against various defecting and cooperating players. Not only do these explain how Tit for Tat did better than even other cooperating players, they have useful implications for real world human interactions. Be NiceDon't be the first to defect. Assume cooperativeness on the part of others. If you go into an interaction assuming that you're going to get ripped off, then you might as well try to take advantage of the other person. But if instead the other person turns out to have been willing to cooperate with you, you've just missed a chance for both of you to do well. Be ForgivingDon't overreact. When taken advantage of, retaliate once, then stop. Meeting one defection with a harsh response can create a series of echoing mutual defections that prevent cooperation from ever occurring. Be ProvocableWhen a defection occurs, always respond in kind. Don't be too forgiving. In the instructions for the second tournament, Axelrod included the two lessons ("be nice" and "be forgiving") that he had drawn from the first tournament. Several of those who submitted second tournament strategies concluded that being forgiving was essential to the evolution of cooperation. Their strategies tended to let a few defections slide. In effect, these strategies tried to elicit cooperation by allowing not-nice players to take advantage of them without penalty. But the actual result was to encourage not-nice strategies to keep defecting. A lesser penalty for defecting made that lack of cooperation more valuable, so cooperation became less valuable. A better choice is to always defect when provoked. Be ClearRespond in kind immediately. Strategies that tried to be clever tended to appear unresponsive, which elicited defection. (If your attempts to cooperate are ignored, then you might as well defect to get as much as you can while you can.) Cooperation should meet with immediate cooperation, and a defection should be met with an immediate defection.
Next: BackgroundThe Prisoner's DilemmaThe Iterated Prisoner's DilemmaThe "Ecological" Prisoner's DilemmaHow Cooperation WorksHow Tit for Tat WorksThe Principles of Tit for TatThe Implications of Tit for TatThe Future of CooperationHome
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